An analysis of coalition-competition pricing strategies for multi-operator mobile traffic offloading using bi-objective heuristics

No Thumbnail Available
Identifiers
Publication date
2017
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Citations
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
In a competitive market relationships between telecommunications operators serving simultaneously over a certain geographical area are diverse and motivated by very different business strategies and goals. Such relationships ultimately yield distinct pricing portfolios depending on the contractual affiliation of the user being served. Furthermore a key role in the last decade is the concept of tethering (connection sharing) which, when controlled by the operator, may help alleviating the consumption of network resources in densely populated scenarios. In this work we investigate the application of bi-objective heuristics for the design of Pareto-optimal network topologies leading to an optimal Pareto between the revenue of the incumbent operators in the scenario and the quality of service degradation experienced by the end users as a result of tethering. Based on computer simulation this work unveils that such a Pareto-optimal set of topologies is strongly determined by the market relationships between such operators.
Description
Publisher Copyright: © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017.
Citation
Consul , J , Perfecto , C , Bilbao , M N & Del Ser , J 2017 , An analysis of coalition-competition pricing strategies for multi-operator mobile traffic offloading using bi-objective heuristics . in J Del Ser (ed.) , Harmony Search Algorithm - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Harmony Search Algorithm (ICHSA 2017) . Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing , vol. 514 , Springer Verlag , pp. 157-167 , Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Harmony Search Algorithm, ICHSA 2017 , Bilbao , Spain , 22/02/17 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3728-3_16
conference